Wednesday, December 29, 2010

Is Sedition an outdated concept?

In light of the recent incident of Binayak Sen's life term imprisonment by a Chhatisgarh Sessions Court, the shock has been widespread and almost unanimous. That a doctor who let go of the luxury the world had to offer to dedicate his life to work with tribals should get a life term in jail on the charge of sedition seems most outrageous.  There have been many voices protesting this judgment. Most of them seem to say that such a guy could not be responsible for sedition. In fact, let me try to divide the paths that these voices have been taking as following.

1. That Binayak Sen does not fulfill the conditions for guilt for the crime of sedition under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code.

2. That evidence supposedly against Binayak Sen with regard to aiding rebels is based on flimsy ground and has been misconstrued by the Court.

And of course there is much weight in these arguments. However, it is notable that both of these arguments are working within the framework of the offence of sedition, that is their major object is to prove that Binayak Sen is not seditious. Now of course, it might be argued what exactly is seditious? Section 124 A of the Indian Penal Code defines it thus, 

124A Sedition
Whoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards. [* * *] the Government established by law in [India], [* * *] shall be punished with [imprisonment for life], to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment which may extend to three years, to which fine may be added, or with fine.


Explanation 1-The expression "disaffection" includes disloyalty and all feelings of enmity.
Explanation 2-Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of the attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section.
Explanation 3-Comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative or other action of the Government without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or disaffection, do not constitute an offence under this section.    "

And of course, critics of the judgment can thus come up with a third argument to say:
3. That to be the medium of exchange of letters from a single person in jail to a Kolkata businessman cannot constitute "words that attempt to bring into hatred of contempt"..." or disaffection towards the government established by law."

Some others might come up with a fourth argument:
4. That the definition of Sedition under the Indian Penal Code needs an overhaul as it infringes upon other rights of the individual...say, the right to freedom.

Again, it come back to the same thing~ An attempt to prove that the actions of Binayak Sen fall out of the category of seditious...either legally, or morally, and hence he should not be convicted.
However, in this post, I will attempt to argue that the very concept of sedition is outdated and should be done away with.
If one looks at the history of the offence of sedition, it of course, emerged with the emergence of absolute States and assumed its present form with the colonial rule. In fact, sedition was omitted as an offence by Macaulay in the first version of the IPC (probably not intentionally though), and was brought in by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen almost a decade later. Much of the history of the legislation seems to convey its logic by citing what a huge problem it could be if personal religious interests clashed with the interests of the State. So that say, if a person was advocating that the State was in violation of Hindu religious beliefs, and thus inciting violence against the State, or say, saying that Muslims are set to destroy Hindus, and thus inciting violence within the State generally..."sedition" comes to the rescue, whereby it says that this won't do.

So Sedition has been traditionally a secular tool used by the State to fight against the arch enemy which Statehood, in its history, has been bent on replacing, that is, religion.

Switch to the present scenario, though. We live in a world where the State has many important enemies, as opposed to just one. Take terrorism itself for example. And almost 99% we equate the enemies of the State to the enemies of the people living within the State, which incidentally is a conclusion which is not always true. It is worthy to note that as citizens of a State and with the spread of the hegemony of nationalism, we have begun to equate our interests with the interests of the State. But is that really the situation? The most primary interest of the State is to ensure its own existence. True, that to much extent, there is a marriage of convenience, for we see the State as our protector from wars and suchlike, as largely propounded by John Locke and Thomas Hobbes in their theories of Social Contract; and if the State ceases to exist, we would supposedly be more vulnerable. But to equate all aspect of State action with our own personal interest would be a sorry mistake.

It is important to understand that the idea of a State itself has been founded upon individual interests of power. The State is in fact, a medium to retain power clusters, and thereby to maintain peace in the territory. Mostly, the idea is to find a balance of interests, which effectively means the suppression of one kind of interest.
As I have already noted in one of my earlier posts, that the values which a State tries to establish as standard, are not actually universally standard values, but values of a particular group, which concur in fostering the existence of the State.
And now, what does offence of sedition actually entail? Suppression of any value which goes against the interests of the State and not necessarily the interests of the people at large. It is another matter that we are hegemonised into thinking that the two are one and the same. ( Read Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities for more on this perspective of how nations are imagined.)

There are many instances of this, one which interests me to a great extent, being the approach to tackle terrorism. I do not say that I'm agreeing with the course of violence that most terrorism takes, but note that Section 124A , bans not violence, but words, and words which disseminate opinion the "Government established by law", thus essentially perpetuating the idea that Whatever may, the Government is right.

Critics of course would argue that if such a provision were not present, there would be total chaos, people going crazy left and right and the spread of propaganda uncurbed. To them I just want to reply, Consider the present situation, is it any better? We have let Binayak Sen be jailed, and yes, I would agree he was an opposer of state policies, for life.

Only because it has been done in a supposedly less-chaotic manner and as per procedure doesn't mean the situation is less insane. Procedure, is of course, something to abide by, but to say that the crime of sedition fosters procedural law should rather should make one ask...procedure for whose benefit? 'Cause it is worthy to remember that even Hobbes and Locke agreed that it was a Social Contract. One thing which then becomes pertinent to ask in the present scenario is whether we as mere people, and not people of any particular nation-State or regime, nor as citizens of a country, whether we, as mere human beings have been reduced to the lesser beneficiaries of such a contract? Sedition is one tool which lets the State exercise undue influence in its interest over tools for our interests as human beings in the contract, i.e. our human rights. It's high time we began asking, How far does the Reasonable Restriction Clause really stand meaningful in our lives, especially once we break out of the Statist universalism that we as people, and the State are not one and the same? And is all the violence imposed by the State in connexion with the restoration of that order which is in its own interest, worth it?


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Thursday, October 28, 2010

Wikileaks case: The Intellectual Property Aspect

Lately, with the release of classified US document wrt the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars there have been a lot of musing about whether Wikileaks can legally do so. One of the issues which does come up is that of State sovereignty- public release of classified documents of the State indeed raises the question whether sovereignty of the State has been infringed. However, assuming even though such infringement has happened, the problem which one faces is the persecution of Wikileaks, and it is this question of jurisdiction that has largely been in discussion considering Julian Assange has been elusive. Though another aspect which has largely been ignored is the intellectual property rights infringement aspect.
It is clear that some insider in the Pentagon has been leaking these documents via the Wikileaks forum- the question is, whether this insider when caught can be prosecuted on the basis of copyright infringement of the documents which the US State essentially had rights in. In this regard, one can look at English case of Fraser v. Evans [1969] 1 All ER 8(CA), wherein the defendant had made some papers public , which he was given access to, in confidence, by the Greek government. Lord Denning herein, remarked that copyright infringement could not be held in a "matter of public concern", and "only making a fair comment in public interest". So in the instant case, the point of determination is whether the documents released were indeed in public interest- one might a well argue so. However, comes the question of "fair comment in public interest." In the instant case, it was a direct reproduction of the documents, rather than a fair comment...would that make a difference?
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Wednesday, September 01, 2010

Some thoughts on the Naxal movement in India, I : Separating the tribal from the Naxal

Let's start with the obliteration of the mainstream prejudice that Naxals are a threat. Though in fact, this statement in itself is ambiguous- threat to what exactly? The present governmental system, the idea of India as a nation-State, or the socialist-liberal ideological setup? But for the moment, let's just leave aside any such considerations, and look  at the Naxal movement from a very neutral point, from the eyes of someone who has just begun its study and is therefore incapable of drawing conclusions with regard to its nature in the present state.
That being said, one of the most striking features of the Naxal movement is that the movement centres around the tribal community and their rights. Essentially the realisation of these rights under the Naxal movement is sought to be achieved largely via communist routes. A look at the history of the Naxal movement will tell us that it was organised and channelised mostly by political parties of the communist outlook, which, in all political correctness, appalled by the socio-economic, cultural(?) injustice prevalent in the society, hoped to bring a 'democratic regime' in India. Concentrating specifically on the tribal communities, which seemed especially piqued by the post-independence setup-the channelisation of these groups began, to achieve the India of dreams, so to say.

But whose dreams? There are actually two questions to ask here- First, was this the India everyone, specifically, the tribals here, were dreaming of? Second, did the tribal dream even have an India? I intend to focus here upon the latter and the more basic of these two questions. This question essentially entails asking what was/ has been the thing which tribals have been aspiring for? Thus, I'm implicitly but pertinently distinguishing the Naxal movement from the 'tribal  movement' (for the lack of other appropriate term.) But I also intend to find out where these two do find a common ground and converge.

The starting point of most recent tribal protest which is often also thought to be the beginning point of Naxal movement is 2 March 1967, when local landlords attacked a tribal youth as he was going to plough his land after obtaining a judicial order in the now famous Naxalbari village of WB. The attack led to retaliation by tribals which left 9 tribals and 1 police sub-inspector dead. It's to be noted here that the dispute was basically agrarian and/or feudal. An infight between tribals and landlords, where the former wanted control over land portions, while the latter didn't want to give it up. 
It is actually interesting to note that there's a long history of disputes of this nature in India, since atleast colonial times, when the diku-adivasi infighting and rivalry with regard to land is pretty evident. A tribal village functioned under the Mandali system (atleast in the Jungle Mahal area) whereby the Mandal head encouraged cultivation of waste lands under him- which were granted to the tribals. Gradually though, among other factors, with the increasing pressure of revenue collection by the British government (so much so that there was actually a commercial British Zamindari company in the area called the MZC or Midnapore Zamindari Company, which made its profits solely via revenue collection), the ancient rights of tribals increasingly started to be ignored. Mandal heads concentrated on profits- arbitrary taking away of land from tribals, and restriction upon gathering of forest produce became common. That's when tribal resistance to such instances began developing. (Refer Santal History from the Jungle Mahals). So essentially it was a fight for land, again. 

The 'problem' with tribal community was/is that they had little notion of the concept of State. They'd hardly experienced the full thrust of Mughal rule, and the craze of revenue collection in colonial times, to say the least, bewildered them. It escaped them how ancient tribal rights like those relating to forest produce collection and pasture lands could be regulated by State. For them these were communal rights- non-derogable rights possessed by them by mere virtue of being an adivasi. The notion of individual property which came with the State's claim of propriety over forests, pastures and other tribal lands, kinda escaped them. Thus the tribal resistance has always been fixated upon the restoration of these communal rights back to the tribal people. This, in tribal eyes, is justice for them.

Now let's contrast this with the Naxal movement, which, if one can put it this way, thinks in wider terms.First, it thinks in terms of 'wider justice' to the tribals.  Second, it thinks in terms of this 'wider justice' to tribals implying a better India. In fact, these two ideas are largely inter-related, and I won't say that the second is an implication of the first or vice-versa, i.e. there's no cause-effect relationship between them. 

The tribals, they are not thinking in terms of India and its development- they are just thinking of tribal communal rights. And tribal communal rights, for them, are not a means to the end of a better State. The achievement of these rights for them is the end itself. And in fact, tribal communal rights and India (as a State) and its interests come largely into conflict, for the very idea (root of existence) of State is based upon the idea of individual property: this means State is essentially seen as an individual with a right to own property. Further, the authority of the State as an individual is implied from its sovereignty. This means that if the existence of the State is threatened, almost every right (here 'right' as understood in the common sense of word, Right to freedom of speech, free movement, Life, etc.) is derogable by the State, as is proved by the exclusion clauses to the same effect of the various international conventions on human rights today. (eg. ICCPR, ICESCR, Geneva Conventions, etc.) (interestingly, this implies that the State as an individual has superior rights than other individuals.)

Now if communal property is directly opposed to notion of individual property, it brings it into direct conflict with the concept of State. An example of this may be cited in revenue collection. (upon which I hope to expound later.) So the State as an institution itself is likely to threatened by tribal movement.
The threat of the Naxal movement is different, and is concerned with a particular State set-up only. The Naxal movement is openly critical of the capitalist State and liberal values. In contrast the tribal movement is implicitly critical of the institution of State in itself. [..thus dubbing tribal movement as subaltern, and Naxal movement as elite, as per the understandings of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Dipesh Chakrabarty]

The difference between Naxal and tribal movement, thus being established, the next step becomes to find out, when the State says, 'we need to counter Naxalites and Maoist insurgency,' what is it really referring to? The Naxal movement, or the tribal movement? Or both? And if both- is it referring to both of them separately, as in on the separate grounds as clarified above, or do Naxal and tribal movement indeed have a common ground of convergence somewhere?


DISCLAIMER: When i use 'tribals' in this post (and in subsequent ones relating to this theme), I do not mean an actual person from the tribal community. I'm rather referring to a concept understood as the tribal. Same goes with 'Naxal'/'Naxalite', whereby I don't mean to refer to an actual person from the movement, but rather to the idea or concept. Actual persons, in my opinion, are never made of one single idea. So a real person might incorporate both tribal and Naxal notions together in himself.


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Tuesday, August 24, 2010

Human Rights, Cultural Relativism and Suffering

I have been mulling upon the elite-subaltern debate, and how the State, among others, might be categorizing and discriminating on basis on Dalit-Adivasi categories.
I was reading Upendra Baxi's 'The Future of Human Rights', when I was somehow drawn to the idea of cultural relativism, and kinda tried to link it to our earlier discussion. Perhaps the Statist ideas are largely tied up with a certain way of thinking, like with respect to development, and human rights? One interesting thing which I observed is that in the present regime, "human rights" are largely provided against the State. But then again, perhaps the idea of the State itself is something which has erupted from the same thought process which gives rise to "human rights" ?
I happened to come across certain criticism of the modern agenda of human rights, especially from Africa and the African Union, in many instances of which human rights were actually termed as "monsters", which are set to destroy their culture; And then I came across a quote by Tony Blair post-9/11, which actually in as much words, said that the current situation (refering to terrorism and stuff) is prevalent, because not everyone understands certain values and abides by them, and well, to protect ourselves we need to advocate the spread of these values...um, I found the quote, it went like..

"The best defence of our security lies in the spread of our values. But we cannot advance these values except within a framework that recognises their universality. If it is a global threat, it needs a global response, based on global rules" - Tony Blair, 5 March 2004 

To say the truth, it was quite a bit shocking to me to read this, because I'd been assuming that politicians, and other people, who are not directly concerned with the academic and scholarly research, people who were more "practical" and who are our 'leaders' and make laws, were perhaps all under the impression that human rights are indeed something of an absolute, something universal, which everyone is inherently entitled to- I mean that's what to hear and read (in between lines or not) in the usual textbooks and media, that wherever certain guidelines are not being followed, it's a "violation of human rights". But then Blair's quote sort of made it starkly clear that political leaders also perhaps understand that it might not necessarily be a 'violation', because those human rights which they talk about might not be necessarily established as "human rights," for everyone. And understanding this, he advocates the "spread of our values", so that "human rights" indeed become universal. I had little clue that there was conscious awareness on part of the world leaders, that 'human rights' are indeed to be used as a weapon, and that they are consciously on the offense!

Then I read bits of Eleanor Roosevelt's agenda while she was the Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the UNDHR. And reading between the lines, the sense of Blair's speech from the perspective of the "West" (if you will; for the lack of a better term), kept coming back to me.

But then I was thinking of certain things which were practised in "non-Western" settings, and which the "West" had assaulted as human rights violation. Like, purdah...child marriage, widow excommunication? And I couldn't really think of them in good terms either. I mean , I had to side by the "West" there in assaulting them- but I was confused! Was that only because my own values had been so shaped and influenced by "Western" ideas and education, that I could no longer think through perspectives sans the "West"?

But still, I could hardly find a parameter- a fair parameter, to judge certain actions- as right or wrong. Then I recalled Foucault, and his ideas on power struggles, and the absence of ...well...a naturally/inherently right-wrong thing. But what does that imply? That all our talks of reform and development are just a myth? Or a game?...hmm, maybe, but isn't it true that people are suffering due to certain regimes/laws, for example, take the tribals in India...so even if the whole thing is just a power struggle for alternative hegemonies, what about the people who bear the brunt of it all? Is there no recourse for them, because any parameter of development/reform/happiness of people is coloured by the 'values in power'?

Though of course, when we say that a person is 'suffering', we use the parameter of certain values to judge that he/she is. But then how does one reconcile the suffering seen from parameter of values X with the 'rights' granted against suffering as seen from parameter of values Y? Is the only solution in this regard is to do what Tony Blair suggests? That is, enforce a framework which recognises the universality of a particular set of values, say Y? Because perhaps as long as power struggles are on, there is little hope for reconciliation in this regard. The recent French burqa ban would perhaps be an interesting issue to consider in the case- the Muslim community in France following the parameter of values X, and the French government of Y.
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Thursday, August 19, 2010

Change of plans...

I remember I started blogging here because I was incensed by the courtroom drama in Jessica Lal's case, back in 2006, and as an angsty teenager, I needed an outlet. I remember it was also a time when social media was just blossoming in India, and the possibilities were exciting. I named this blog "Stand for a cause" back then, as I was hugely frustrated by the lack of action around me, with regard to what Amartya Sen calls "remediable injustices".
Four years since then, I've perhaps lost the passion for causes, and like any adult, am more inclined to accept things as they are. Also, two years as a law student, my perception of law has changed quite a bit, and is definitely more informed now. So I propose here, from this moment onwards, to write more specifically about law, more objectively with the ideas it deals with, and yeah, be more regular. My prime areas of interest being constitutional law, international law and intellectual property, I intend to focus more upon these, but of course that does not rule out deviations. I'm hardly prone to following straight lines. Further I also feel that law, being inter-disciplinary, can rarely be understood without widening sights. This process of narrowing down to specifics, while keeping the larger picture in view, is not easy, and I hope I'd be upto the task; if I begin losing my head, do tell me..=) 
So here I formally announce that I have decided to change my plans, and in light of the same, hereby re-christen this blog to "Law and Perceptions"...
                                                                                     
...Hope you are not averse to the change...

                                         ....The blog's at least orange now! ;) 


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Friday, April 23, 2010

Determining the moral quantum in homosexuality

Everyone hates our criminal law professor because...well, of many reasons. Anyway, one of the primary of those is that he argues that homosexuality is against public morality.
It's kind of one of his favourite topics actually, and due to my...ahem...pervert instincts, I find it wildly interesting, even while others die of his rant about the Naz Foundation case. So he goes on to say what a dire judgment it is, for it is detaching criminal law from the precepts of public morality. And then everyone goes nuts because mahn, we are so elite, and how can we ever think that homosexuality is NOT the norm!

Well, let's consider what public morality really is. Ummm...no that's a really hard question to consider in such limited space, so it could be something you could just mull upon. But consider this. We say it is NOT immoral to be homosexual. Yet honestly how many of us are really comfortable with it? I know for one that my next-door neighbour definitely is not.

Morality is not a redundant concept. It is visible in the way we react to things. Immorality manifests not only in the instance of Ram Sena chasing harried couples, but also when one discreetly sniggers at PDA-ers. Simply saying that Public displays are okay, then does not make it moral for the person saying it. Because the comfort level with the  thing is still absent.
Now notice that the people who contend homosexuals to fall within the moral ambit, do live within the symbolic where morality is the sanction to righteousness. They do not try to blur the boundaries of morality, rather kinda strengthen it, by recognising it exists, and then recognising its importance by heavily parading (or trying to), the morality of homosexuality. In other words, the attempt is just to try to expand the boundaries of morality, rather than blur it. 

All this points towards, first, how important morality is to our society; and second, homosexuality is still not a part of public morality, because the personal comfort level with it does not exist. A homosexual is something exotic...and for us elite, something exotic to be patronised. A homosexual is NOT mundane...howsoever much we try to act that way ( in order to slash the accusations of being the elite patron against us), but in our minds, a homosexual is still excitement, a new possibility, something off-the-track. It's not mainstream, howsoever much we try to convince ourselves by saying it aloud. A homosexual is still a deviant. Hence, not within the public morality. That's why it's easier to let go off a pass made by a hetero, than by a homo. The latter is scary or more exciting...in any case, it persists longer in the memory.

But some food for thought: Is it so bad being qualified immoral if you are homo? I mean as long as you get your due rights...via the rights jurisprudence, which is taking over the criminal law jurisprudence, as propounded by Habermas? ;) That's where Dr. Shukla needs to be questioned, if you will.... heehee.
On the other hand, what makes an immoral being so ostracising that morality HAS to be attributed to him? In other words, morality really is an essential if one wants to persists in a society, isn't it?
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Monday, April 05, 2010

The construction of nationalistic chauvinism

Lately, the discussion around Sania Mirza and her marriage to Pakistani cricketer Shoaib Malik has been flared a lot. Sometimes I wonder if such silly topics are even worth the discussion. But the entire incident is kind of a pointer towards the chauvinistic path nationalism seems to be taking...
Under a news item, Bal Thackeray has decried Sania as not Indian enough, and from my Facebook browsing, I'm sorry to say that many of my friends agree. What I fail to understand, however, is how can one judge one's indian-ness or non-indian-ness from what views one holds about another country. Okay, so she's getting married to a Pakistani...so merely the fact that she is friendly with a Pakistani is enough to decry her as a non-Indian!

I mean, such a narrow construction of nationalism, which is supposed to thrive on hate for other nations, rather than pride in one's own, is truly regrettable.

Consider if this was the way the world operated, then all economies would actually close down, because trade ultimately benefits both the nations involved in it. International laws and treaties would never be respected. Cultural exchanges between nations would completely shut down. In other words, we would be living under enclosed walls, built up by the mortar of despise and the brick of hatred. Is this really the world we'd like to live in?

In such a scenario, one should be wary of the direction in which nationalism seems to be heading. Mistrust and disgust is certainly not how the world thrives, and any exaggerated ideas of nationalism incorporating these should be viewed with a careful eye, and heard with guarded ear, rather than blind internalisation.


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Wednesday, March 31, 2010

Why live-ins should not be legalised

I came across an article today hailing the steps being taken by the Indian judiciary towards granting a legal status to live-in relationships. However, even without honking the conservative argument that live-ins destroy the sanctity of marriage, blah, blah, is live-in legalisation seriously something to cheer about?...

Let's take a look what the legalisation of live-in relationships will really entail: right to maintenance, right to property and inheritance, even right to enforce co-habitation....in short, all the ingredients which make a marriage.  What will then make a live-in different from a marriage? The absence of a ceremony? So marriage is the rich guy's live-in who can afford a party...how lame does that sound?

I've been hearing a lot of talk about how legalising live-ins will give them social sanction...but will that really happen? Consider that the widow remarriage today is still a kind of social stigma, even though the requisite legislation for it had been passed some 150 years back in the form of The Widow Remarriage Act, 1856. And even though inter-caste marriages are legally permissible, they do not enjoy social popularity. On the other hand, child marriage still has social sanction, even as laws to discourage it have been implemented. 
Also consider that people usually enjoy attending parties, and hence are less likely to grant social sanction to something which excludes them from the benefit of one. =P
But forget arguments breaking the defence of legalisation. Think for a moment what a live-in really means. The very concept of a live-in, which is essentially anarchist in nature, exists outside the purview of law. While marriage lets the law intervene into the sphere of personal relationships, live-ins try to escape this interference by law, in a field which the proponents of live-ins consider essentially private. The concept of a live-in entails the shift of risk-bearing to the people in the relationship. It entails freedom by the removal of obligations, by giving the opportunity to walk-out. And sometimes I fail to understand what's so wrong about this...True, one may get hurt, but isn't that worse than living a hypocrisy of obligations when you don't even feel any kind of attachment to a person?
Well, anyway, that isn't exactly my point here. My point is that live-ins are an entirely different concept from marriage. But by trying to legalise it, courts are converting live-ins into pseudo-marriages, and thus eroding the very aim of a live-in: experiments, and the freedom to ditch an experiment gone awry.
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